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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a pricing model of railway infra-
structure capacity allocation functioning as a regulatory 
measure while fulfilling the regulatory requirements on 
railway infrastructure capacity allocation. The prices of 
railway infrastructure capacity allocation will be mod-
elled with regard to all economically justifiable costs of 
railway infrastructure capacity allocation. The struc-
ture of model has been developed as a set of calculation 
sheets in Microsoft Excel. The recommended prices for 
railway capacity have been found by simulation of a set 
of variants and the recommendation is done for different 
operational conditions in an individual way. It analyses 
different products offered by the railway infrastructure 
capacity allocator both in the annual working timetable 
mode, and in the individual ad hoc mode. The aim of the 
proposed model is to motivate not only railway undertak-
ings, but also the railway infrastructure capacity alloca-
tor to submit requests for railway infrastructure capacity 
in the annual working timetable mode rather than in the 
individual ad hoc mode. The total price is then verified 
to the cost of railway infrastructure capacity allocation. 
This process then ensures the regulation of the demand 
of railway undertakings on the given route and can in-
fluence the decision about the use of the product offered.
KEYWORDS
model; railway infrastructure; infrastructure access 
charges; charging system; railway capacity; timetable.
1. INTRODUCTION
The main railway transport regulation in the 
Czech Republic is the Act No. 367/2019 Coll., on 
Rail Systems, as amended. The Act contains provi-
sions on railway infrastructure capacity allocation 
[1]. Gradually, the process of railway infrastructure 
capacity allocation was also influenced by the Eu-
ropean legislation, namely by Directive 2012/34/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(after the Czech Republic joined the EU). Among 
other things, the Directive contains a provision gov-
erning the process of levying charges and railway 
infrastructure capacity allocation for allocators [2]. 
This made it possible for the railway infrastructure 
capacity allocators to start trading in available rail-
way infrastructure capacity and ensure its potential 
optimal use. The Directive defines the minimum ac-
cess package, i.e. a list of services to be provided by 
the railway infrastructure capacity allocators [3]. It 
specifies the scope of services related to access the 
infrastructure and service facilities, both in terms of 
basic and additional services. 
The minimum access package according to Di-
rective 2012/34/EU comprises the following [2]:
a) handling of requests for railway infrastructure 
capacity;
b) the right to utilise capacity which is granted;
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This is a very complex task for the Railway Infra-
structure Administration, that has to set the price co-
efficients for the different types of requests to cov-
er the costs associated with the capacity allocation 
within a period of 12 months, but at the same time 
not to make a profit. All these principles are anal-
ysed in the introduction part of the paper, including 
a search of available scientific papers on this topic. 
The novelty of the authors' approach is mainly that 
none of the available sources deals with this issue 
of modelling and does not address the possibility of 
modelling revenues from capacity allocation using 
mathematical apparatus. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to the Rail Network Statement, the 
railway infrastructure capacity means the possibility 
to include train routes requested for specific rail sec-
tions for a specific time period [6]. It is expressed as 
the number of train routes which can be created in 
a specific time period given the existing technical, 
operational and personal capacities and maintaining 
the necessary transport quality.
According to internal regulations of the RIA, 
railway infrastructure capacity means the usable 
capacity of a rail allowing for the allocation of the 
required train routes on a specific rail section in a 
specific time period [7].
The allocation of railway infrastructure capacity 
means an action allowing for the use of such por-
tion of total railway infrastructure capacity, which 
is necessary for the required train route. Until 2004, 
the railway infrastructure capacity had been allocat-
ed by the Office for Railways but since the annual 
timetable of 2005, the railway infrastructure capac-
ity has been allocated independently by the alloca-
tor, i.e. by the RIA [8]. Levying charges for railway 
capacity allocation has developed in time as well. 
For setting the amount of charges for the railway 
infrastructure capacity allocation, the price of route-
day and of the route used have been used since the 
beginning. Gradually, (since 2013), coefficients 
(K1, K2, and K3) have been added to the formula, 
reflecting the price per kilometre of the planned 
route, in addition to the price of route-day and of 
the route used. In the minimum access package, the 
total price is composed of the price of the railway 
infrastructure capacity allocation and the price for 
the use of the railway infrastructure through a train 
ride [9].
c) use of the railway infrastructure, including track 
points and junctions;
d) train control including signalling, regulation, 
dispatching and the communication and provi-
sion of information on train movement;
e) use of electrical supply equipment for traction 
current, where available;
f) all other information required to implement or 
operate the service for which capacity has been 
granted.
The minimum scope of the services offered is 
currently defined by the Decree No. 76/2017 Coll. 
In the Czech Republic, the assessing of railway in-
frastructure capacity and its allocation is defined 
by the Act No. 367/2019 coll., on Rail Systems, 
as amended, and the process of railway infrastruc-
ture capacity allocation is specified in the nation-
al and regional Rail Network Statement issued by 
the Railway Infrastructure Administration (RIA) 
for the given annual timetable [4]. The Act on Rail 
Systems defines the rights and obligations of the 
railway infrastructure capacity allocator (railway 
infrastructure manager – RIA) and of the individual 
railway undertakings (passenger and freight railway 
undertakings). Furthermore, the provisions of this 
Act stipulate that the process of railway infrastruc-
ture capacity allocation is based on the principle of 
non-discrimination, meaning that all railway under-
takings can have access to railway infrastructure 
upon meeting the conditions required for operat-
ing the railway transport services. On state-owned 
national and regional rails, the railway infrastruc-
ture capacity allocator is the RIA [5]. On privately 
owned rails, the railway infrastructure capacity is 
allocated by an allocator appointed by the respec-
tive rail owner.
The focus of this research is on modelling to 
determine the price for capacity allocation by the 
creation of a timetable for railways in the Czech Re-
public. The aim is to find the optimal ratio between 
the offered routes on a regular schedule (individual 
products offered by the RIA) and train routes in the 
ad hoc mode. The evaluation criteria are the cost 
of rail capacity allocation and the cost of railway 
infrastructure allocation. Modelling the price for the 
allocation of rail capacity is an influence on the de-
cisions of individual carriers to use the given prod-
ucts or to use train paths in the ad hoc mode. Within 
the EU, there is a regulation that requires the Rail-
way Infrastructure Administration not to generate 
profit-making activities for the capacity allocation. 
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the use of railway infrastructure through a train ride 
includes the direct costs of ensuring the operability 
of the railway (maintenance and wear-and-tear re-
pairs of the infrastructure due to the train ride) [20]. 
Furthermore, the price for the use of railway infra-
structure through a passenger train ride includes the 
direct costs of maintenance and wear-and-tear re-
pairs of access roads for passengers (not considered 
in calculating the price for the use of railway infra-
structure through a passenger train are the costs of 
maintenance and repairs of fixed installations). [21]
The basic price for the use of railway infrastruc-
ture through a train ride is calculated according to 
Formula 2 using unit prices determined for passenger 
trains and freight trains [7]:
C C CURI NTK GTK= +  (2)
where:
CURI – total basic price for the use of railway i 
    nfrastructure through a train ride (EUR);
CNTK – price for the use of railway infrastructure  
    through a train ride in the performance  
    segment based on net train kilometres  
    (EUR);
CGTK – the price for the use of railway  
    infrastructure through a train ride in the  
    performance segment based on gross train  
    kilometres (EUR).
The requests for railway infrastructure capacity 
are processed electronically in IS KANGO (Com-
plex application for on-line train diagram creation) 
or IS KADR (Railway capacity). Regular requests 
for railway infrastructure capacity to be taken into 
account when creating the annual working timetable 
and late requests for railway infrastructure capacity 
to be taken into account when creating the annu-
al working timetable are processed in IS KANGO, 
whereas the individual ad hoc requests for railway 
infrastructure capacity are processed in IS KADR 
[22].
Different modes of railway infrastructure capac-
ity allocation have been described in [7, 8]. Detailed 
description is given on the basic classification of 
modes of railway infrastructure capacity allocation, 
including the mode of processing of annual timeta-
ble and its changes and the individual ad hoc mode. 
The authors not only describe the individual modes 
of railway infrastructure capacity allocation includ-
ing their subgroups, but also the requirements on 
request target groups [23]. 
Determining traffic efficiency is tackled in [10-
12]. However, these only compare the railway line 
capacity indicators before and after the modernisa-
tion of the railway infrastructure. The actual process 
of traffic optimization on these lines is not described 
anywhere and the possibilities of train operation 
simulation are only described briefly [13]. It is only 
the demographic factors influencing the demand for 
public transport that are mostly taken into account 
[14].
The authors [15] deal with the capacity fees and 
connecting regional, national and local railways. 
For the purposes of that research, a model of the 
current and future situations was created. Based on 
the simulation model, several variants of operation 
of new passenger trains under new conditions were 
proposed and analysed. This study served as the ba-
sis for connecting national and regional railways in 
Croatia. The same was true for [16] that dealt with 
setting the railway infrastructure fees on regional 
railways. 
The price of railway infrastructure capacity al-
location is influenced by a number of factors. In 
addition to the processing complexity of a request, 
these include the length of the time interval between 
filing a request for the railway infrastructure capac-
ity allocation and the requested date of railway use 
and whether the request is a request to be taken into 
account when creating the annual working time-
table or an individual ad hoc request [17, 18]. For 
setting the amount of charges for the railway infra-
structure capacity allocation, the following Formula 
1 was used:
C K K D K PICA L D1 2 3$ $= + +  (1)
where:
CICA – price of railway infrastructure capacity  
    allocation (EUR);
K1  – price of processing and determining the  
    timetable and railway infrastructure  
    capacity allocation (EUR);
K2  – price of train route creation [EUR per km];
K3  – price of train route allocation per day 
    [EUR per day];
DL  – route length [km];
PD  – number of route-days [day].
The price for the use of railway infrastructure is 
established based on the data on the length and pa-
rameters of the given rail, on the type of transport 
(passenger, freight) and on the parameters of the 
train including those that can have an impact on the 
basic, tender or increased prices [19]. The price for 
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capacity allocation for coefficients K1, K2 and K3 for 
different products, with values applicable for 2019 
[8].
The starting point for modelling the calculation 
formula is the determination of the following:
 – Direct costs of railway infrastructure capacity 
allocation – the price of railway infrastructure 
capacity allocation depends on the system used 
for addressing the request and on the number of 
general routes requested. Taken into account in 
calculating the price of railway infrastructure ca-
pacity allocation are the operating costs of the 
RIA information systems and other professional 
activities necessary to include the general routes 
in the train timetable.
 – Price of the railway infrastructure capacity allo-
cation – the price of the railway infrastructure 
capacity allocation includes the payment for the 
process of railway infrastructure capacity alloca-
tion, payment for the creation of a train timetable 
(excluding the costs of printing and distributing 
the materials) allocated to the request of the ap-
plicant, and also the payment for the operational 
implementation of the train and the surcharge for 
short-term processing of the request.
3. MODELLING OF RAILWAY 
INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY 
ALLOCATION
The aim of modelling is to find the prices for the 
railway capacity. The simulation was based on a 
set of considered variants. The recommendation is 
done for different operational conditions in an indi-
vidual way.
In [8], to model the price of the railway infra-
structure capacity allocation, the authors presume 
that the revenue from the railway infrastructure 
capacity allocation must be higher or equal to the 
direct costs of allocation, i.e. that the costs of allo-
cation must always be covered by the price of allo-
cation.
The amounts of revenue are based on all the 
products offered (RJ, PJ, ZJ, N3, P3, TB, ZK, UI, 
OM, and JD). The last three products (UI, OM, and 
JD) are negligible in relation to the total price of the 
railway infrastructure capacity allocation, and are 
not considered in further modulations of the calcu-
lation formula [29, 30]. 
Also taken into account is the processing of re-
quests using the allocator's software tools IS KANGO 
and IS KADR. The IS KANGO tool is mainly used 
These are requests for railway infrastructure ca-
pacity to be taken into account when creating the 
annual timetable (products RJ - regular request for 
railway capacity allocation to be taken into account 
when creating the annual timetable, PJ - late request 
for railway capacity allocation to be taken into ac-
count when creating the annual timetable, and ZJ - 
request for railway capacity allocation until the next 
change of the annual timetable) and ad hoc requests 
for railway infrastructure capacity (products N3 - ad 
hoc request for railway capacity allocation submit-
ted three and more working days before the first re-
quested date of train departure, P3 - ad hoc request 
for railway capacity allocation submitted later than 
three working days, TB - ad hoc request for railway 
capacity allocation for technical and safety tests, 
ZK - ad hoc request for railway capacity allocation 
for test rides of vehicles of unapproved type or rides 
at a speed exceeding the track speed, UI - ad hoc 
request for railway capacity allocation for RIA in-
frastructure maintenance, OM - ad hoc request for 
railway capacity allocation due to RIA infrastruc-
ture restrictions, and JD - ad hoc request for railway 
capacity allocation for other reasons attributable to 
the RIA) [8].
This segmentation has a significant impact on 
the modelling of price of railway infrastructure ca-
pacity allocation. For different products defined, the 
maximum railway infrastructure capacity values 
(i.e. route-days) are specified [24]. Furthermore, 
there is a basic formula for determining the price 
of railway infrastructure capacity allocation adapted 
and modified by the authors to be expressed as an 
inequation taking into account the maximum num-
ber of allocated route-days. This modification relied 
on the assumption that the products offered would 
be used optimally, allowing for maximum use of the 
products by the railway undertakings at a reason-
able cost [25, 26].  
Based on this modification, a break-even point 
was determined between different products for rail-
way infrastructure capacity allocation in the annual 
timetable mode and in the ad hoc mode. The aim 
was to find a balance between the products offered, 
as far as the number of route-days are considered 
[27, 28]. 
Variant 0 was defined as the initial variant of the 
model, modelling the current situation and using the 
current way of railway infrastructure capacity alloca-
tion to determine the price of railway infrastructure 
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[31]. To all ad hoc products, the same coefficient 
K1 price applies which is 0.06 times higher than the 
K1 price for an annual timetable mode product. The 
authors maintained the current ratio between the an-
nual timetable and ad hoc modes. Coefficient K2 is 
the price per km of train route creation, and coeffi-
cient K3 is the price per day of train route allocation. 
In all calculation variants, the authors proposed a 
non-zero price of coefficient K2 per route kilometre 
for ad hoc products to take into account the route 
creation complexity. To motivate the railway un-
dertakings and applicants to submit requests in the 
annual timetable mode, the coefficient K1 price was 
reduced in all annual timetable mode products to 
EUR 56. A coefficient K2 price of EUR 0.28 per km 
was established for RJ, with a coefficient K3 price 
of EUR 0.36 per route-day being set for RJ as well.
A new limit number of route-days was calculat-
ed according to Formula 16 as a break-even point of 
price between products RJ and N3, and the number 
of route-days Pdj was used as the unknown x. After 
substitution, the inequation is as follows:
,
.
K K D K P K
K D K P
x x
x
1 400 7 68 9 100 1 68 75
25 8
RJ RJ trRJ RJ djRJ N N
N trRJ N N djRJ N
1 2 3 3 1 3
2 3 3 3 3 3
$ $
$ $










The limit value x for the number of route-days 
for RJ×N3 was rounded to 26.
The authors suggested the simplified expres-
sions of coefficients K1, K2 and K3 into equa-
tions and used the average number of kilometres 
Dtr=68 km (average for the selected products RJ, PJ, 
ZJ, N3 and P3) and limit values for the number of 
route-days Pdj=26 days (break-even point of price 
between products RJ and N3). Total values were 
calculated using constants proposed earlier. After 
simplification, the inequation according to Formula 
17 for the relation of RJ ˂ N3 for an average request 
is as follows:
.
K K D K P K K D
K P
K K K K K
K




RJ RJ tr RJ dj N N tr
N dj
RJ RJ RJ RJ N
N
1 2 3 1 3 2 3
3 3




$ $ $ $
$
+ + + +
+
+ + + +
+
 (17)
This condition stipulates that the price of a regu-
lar request for railway capacity allocation to be tak-
en into account when creating the annual timetable 
for a limit number of route-days should be lower 
than the price of an ad hoc request for railway ca-
pacity allocation submitted three and more working 
days in advance for a limit number of route-days.
for processing requests for RJ, PJ, and ZJ, while IS 
KADR is mainly used for processing requests for 
N3 and P3. In terms of complexity of processing, 
the ratio between K1 value for requests processed 
in IS KANGO and requests processed in IS KADR 
was established as 0.06.
As for K1 for the individual products, the author 
established the following Formulas 3-7:
K KRJ RJ1 1=  (3)
K KPJ RJ1 1=  (4)
K KZJ RJ1 1=  (5)
.K K0 06N RJ1 3 1$=  (6)
.K K K0 06P P RJ1 3 1 3 1$= =  (7)
The authors suggested coefficient K2 by the 
following relations as K2 reflects the construction 
complexity which remains constant with the chang-
ing price. The coefficient K2 ratio for the individual 
products is again based on the current K2 values and 
are as follows in Formulas 8-11:
K KRJ RJ2 2=  (8)
.K K1 3PJ RJ2 2$=  (9)
.K K1 3ZJ RJ2 2$=  (10)
.K K1 5P N2 3 2 3$=  (11)
The authors suggested coefficient K3 by the fol-
lowing relations as K3 reflects the scarcity of capac-
ity which remains constant with the changing price. 
The coefficient K3 ratio for the individual products 
is again based on the current K3 values and are as 
follows in Formulas 12-15:
K KRJ RJ3 3=  (12)
.K K1 3PJ RJ3 3$=  (13)
.K K1 3ZJ RJ3 3$=  (14)
.K K1 5P N3 3 3 3$=  (15)
Coefficient K1 is the price of administrative pro-
cessing and assessing the processing complexity of 
a request for railway capacity allocation, and that 
is why always the same price applies to the annual 
timetable mode products which can be different in 
different calculation variants but always in the same 
way for all the annual timetable mode products 
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This first complementary limiting condition stip-
ulates that the price of a late request for railway ca-
pacity allocation and/or of a request until the next 
change of the annual timetable for a limit number 
of route-days should be lower than the price of an 
ad hoc request for railway capacity allocation sub-
mitted three and more working days in advance for 
a limit number of route-days.
After simplification, the inequation according 
to Formula 23 setting out the second complemen-
tary limiting condition expressing the relation of 





K K D K P R K
K D K P








RJ RJ trRJ RJ dj RJ N
N trN N dj N
RJ RJ RJ RJ RJ
N N N
1 2 3 1 3
2 3 3 3 3 3
1 2 3 1





+ + - +
+ + -
+ + - +
+ + -
 (23)
The second complementary limiting condition 
stipulates that the price of a request for railway 
capacity allocation to be taken into account when 
creating the annual timetable for a limit number of 
route-days minus one route-day should be higher 
than the price of an ad hoc request for railway ca-
pacity allocation submitted three and more working 
days in advance for a limit number of route-days 
minus one route-day.
After simplification, the inequation accord-
ing to Formula 24 setting out another complemen-




. . ( ) .
( )
K K D K P K
K D K P








PJ PJ trPJ PJ dj PJ N
N trN N dj N
RJ RJ RJ PJ RJ
N N N
1 2 3 1 3
2 3 3 3 3 3
1 2 3 1
2 3 3 3 3
$ $
$ $
$ $ $ $ $
$ $
+ + - +
+ + -
+ + - +
+ + -
 (24)
The third complementary limiting condition 
stipulates that the price of a late request for railway 
capacity allocation to be taken into account when 
creating the annual timetable for a limit number of 
route-days minus one route-day should be higher 
than the price of an ad hoc request for railway ca-
pacity allocation submitted three and more working 
days in advance for a limit number of route-days 
minus one route-day.
After simplification, the inequation is as follows 
(25-31):
.K K K K
K K
68 26 0 06
68 26
<RJ RJ RJ RJ
N N
1 2 3 1








K K K K K
K
68 1 1 3 68
1 3 1
<RJ RJ RJ RJ RJ
RJ
1 2 3 1 2
3
$ $ $ $
$ $





K K K K
K K
0 06 68 1 0 06
1 5 68 1 5 1
<RJ N N RJ
N N
1 2 3 3 3 1
2 3 3 3
$ $ $ $
$ $ $ $
+ + +
+ +  (27)
After simplification, the inequation according to 
Formulas 18 and 19 for the relation of RJ˂PJ/ZJ (the 
same form for both products) and for an average re-
quest for a limit number of route-days is as follows:
.
.
K K D K P K K D
K P
K K K K K
K




RJ RJ tr RJ dj PJ PJ tr
PJ dj
RJ RJ RJ RJ RJ
RJ
1 2 3 1 2
3




$ $ $ $
$ $
+ + + +
+





K K D K P K K D
K P
K K K K K
K




RJ RJ tr RJ dj ZJ ZJ tr
ZJ dj
RJ RJ RJ RJ RJ
RJ
1 2 3 1 2
3




$ $ $ $
$ $
+ + + +
+
+ + + +
+
 (19)
This condition stipulates that the price of a regu-
lar request for railway capacity allocation to be tak-
en into account when creating the annual timetable 
for any number of route-days should be lower than 
the price of a late request and/or of a request un-
til the next change of the annual timetable for any 
number of route-days. As the inequations have the 
same form for both products, they can only express 
one unknown.
After simplification, the inequation according to 
Formula 20 for the relation of N3<P3 for an average 




K K D K P K
K D K P
K K K K
K K
0 06 68 1 0 06
1 5 68 1 5 1
<
<
RJ N trN N djN P
P trP P djP
RJ N N RJ
N N
1 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 3
2 3 3 3 3 3
1 2 3 3 3 1
2 3 3 3
$ $
$ $
$ $ $ $






This condition stipulates that the price of an ad 
hoc request for railway capacity allocation submit-
ted three and more working days in advance for any 
number of route-days should be lower than the price 
of an ad hoc request for railway capacity allocation 
submitted later than three working days in advance 
for this number of route-days.
These three inequations contain five unknowns. 
To express all the five unknowns, the author add-
ed another two complementary limiting conditions, 
increasing the number of inequations to five. After 
simplification, the inequation according to Formulas 
21 and 22, which has the same form for both prod-
ucts, expressing the relation of PJ/ZJ<N3 and set-




K K D K P K
K D K P
K K K K
K K
1 3 68 1 3 26 0 06
1 5 68 1 5 26
<
<
/ / /PJ ZJ PJ ZJ tr PJ ZJ dj N
N tr N dj
RJ RJ RJ RJ
N N
2 3 1 3
2 3 3 3
1 2 3 1
2 3 3 3
$ $
$ $
$ $ $ $ $





 (21) ~ (22)
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Variant 1 – the authors created Variant 1 by 
substituting values into simplified inequations ac-
cording to Formulas 25-31 as a new calculation model 
reducing the coefficient K1 price to EUR 56 per re-
quest in RJ, PJ and ZJ, and maintaining a constant 
of 0.06 in coefficient K1 for N3 and P3 and a con-
stant of 1.3 in coefficient K2 and K3 for PJ, ZJ, and 
a constant of 1.5 in coefficients K2 and K3 for P3, 
and introducing a coefficient K2 price of EUR 0.04 
per km for N3, P3, ZK and TB (ad hoc). The total 
revenue from the price of railway capacity alloca-
tion decreased to EUR 4,196,704, the revenue being 
by 1.74% lower than the costs of railway capacity 
allocation.
In Variant 1, the revenue from the price of rail-
way capacity allocation decreased, but the total di-
rect costs of railway capacity allocation remained 
higher than the revenue from the price of railway 
capacity allocation. By applying additional itera-
tions and modelling, the authors came up with six 
calculation variants meeting the above-mentioned 
limiting conditions, achieving higher revenue from 
the price of railway capacity allocation through a 
moderate increase of the constants and the resulting 
coefficients K1, K2 and K3.
Variant 2 – this variant involves increasing the 
coefficient K3 price in PJ and ZJ to EUR 0.5 per 
route-day; the constants remained at 0.06; 1.3; 1.3 
and 1.5, respectively. The total revenue from the 
price of railway capacity allocation increased to 
EUR 4,203,281, the revenue still being by 1.59% 
lower than the total direct costs of the railway ca-
pacity allocation.
Variant 3 – this variant involves increasing the 
constant value to 0.06 in coefficient K1 for N3 and 
P3, increasing the constant value to 1.4; 1.4, respec-





1 3 68 1 3 26






1 2 3 3 3




 (28) ~ (29)
( ) .
( )
K K K K
K K
68 26 1 0 06
68 26 1
>RJ RJ RJ RJ RJ
N N N
1 2 3 1
2 3 3 3 3
$ $ $
$ $
+ + - +
+ + -
 (30)




1 3 68 1 3 26 1
0 06 68 26 1
>
>
RJ RJ RJ PJ
RJ N N N
1 2 3
1 2 3 3 3 3





The authors [8] calculated Variant 0, laying 
down the coefficients using values applicable for 
annual timetable 2018/2019 (the total price of all 
products was EUR 4,385,292 and the costs of rail-
way infrastructure allocation was EUR 4,271,200). 
For this variant, the value of K2 for ad hoc products 
was 0. The difference between revenue and costs 
was determined as EUR 114,092, which can be ex-
pressed as 2.67%. To determine the revenue, limit-
ing conditions were set for the individual products 
offered. These mainly include the number of limit 
kilometres for the individual products offered and 
the total number of requests for the railway infra-
structure capacity for the given product.
The authors modelled six basic variants. In every 
variant, coefficients K1, K2 and K3 were modified 
for different products offered to function as a reg-
ulatory measure, i.e. to ensure a balance between 
products offered to be taken into account when cre-
ating the annual working timetable and individual 
ad hoc products, and to comply with the applicable 
legislation.
For Variant 0.1 provided for the above, with the 
rate per km set at EUR 0.04 for K2 in ad hoc products 
(with the other coefficient values left unchanged), 
the difference between revenue and costs of railway 
infrastructure allocation increased to EUR 514,804 
(by 14.72%) verified to the current situation (Vari-
ant 0). For Variant 0, the break-even point of price 
between the different products offered is shown in 
Figure 1 and Table 1.








Price of  
product (EUR)
Ø price per 
request (EUR)
RJ 68 13,686 0.32 731,593 0.4 2,899,051 2,324,382 169.83
PJ 68 788 0.40 37,661 0.8 132,265 174,460 221.39
ZJ 68 485 0.40 33,727 0.8 32,170 72,207 148.88
ZK 38.4 285 0 11,492 2.8 367 11,972 42.01
TB 19.2 196 0 9,742 2.8 196 4,312 22.00
N3 4 13,534 0 1,357,650 2.8 26,400 128,056 9.46
P3 4 159,968 0 11,491,204 6.4 160,943 1,669,907 10.44
Total price (EUR) 4,385,296 624.01
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of railway capacity allocation increased to EUR 
4,276,201, being by 0.12% higher than the total di-
rect costs of railway capacity allocation.
Variant 6 – the coefficient K1 price in ZK re-
mained at EUR 40 per request and the coefficient 
K1 price in TB remained at EUR 20 per request, and 
the coefficient K2 price in ZK and TB was reduced 
to EUR 0.04 per km of route creation, with coef-
ficient K3 left unchanged. The total revenue from 
the price of railway capacity allocation increased to 
EUR 4,274,502, being by 0.08% higher than the to-
tal direct costs of railway capacity allocation.
4. DISCUSSION
The authors verified the individual calculation 
variants with the total direct costs of railway capac-
ity allocation (see Table 2). The results of the individ-
ual calculation variants in Table 2 can be interpreted 
as follows:
Variant 0 – the current model for the calculation of 
the price of railway capacity allocation using coef-
ficients K1, K2, and K3. In 2019, the revenue from 
railway capacity allocation was 2.67% higher than 
the total direct costs of railway capacity allocation.
Variant 0.1 – the current model introducing the co-
efficient K2 price of EUR 0.04 per km of route cre-
ation in N3, P3, ZK and TB with coefficients K1 and 
K3 left unchanged. In 2019, the revenue from rail-
way capacity allocation would have been 14.72% 
higher than the total direct costs of railway capacity 
allocation.
Variant 1 – a new model for the calculation of the 
price of railway capacity allocation reducing the co-
efficient K1 price to EUR 56 per request in RJ, PJ 
increasing the constant value to 1.6 in coefficient K2 
and K3 for P3. This results in an increase in the coef-
ficient K2 price in PJ and ZJ to EUR 0.4 per km, and 
an increase in the coefficient K3 price in PJ and ZJ 
to EUR 0.5 per route-day. In P3, the coefficient K3 
price increased to EUR 4.8 per route-day. The total 
revenue from the price of railway capacity alloca-
tion increased to EUR 4,273,889, being by 0.06% 
higher than the total direct costs of railway capacity 
allocation.
Another three calculation variants only result-
ed from changing the modelling in ZK and TB, 
which are products for individual ad hoc requests 
for railway capacity allocation with higher demands 
on route creation and negotiation of technical pro-
cedures during the actual train ride. The change in 
these two products has no impact on the limiting 
condition inequations, the only changes involving 
the request price and the total revenue from the 
price of railway capacity allocation [32].
Variant 4 – in this variant, the coefficient K2 
price in ZK and TB was changed to EUR 0.1 per 
kilometre of route creation, with coefficients K1 and 
K3 left unchanged. The total revenue from the price 
of railway capacity allocation increased to EUR 
4,275,588, being by 0.10% higher than the total di-
rect costs of railway capacity allocation.
Variant 5 – for modelling this variant, the co-
efficient K1 price in ZK was increased to EUR 40 
per request and the coefficient K1 price in TB was 
increased to EUR 20 per request, and the coef-
ficient K2 price in ZK and TB remained at EUR 
0.1 per km of route creation, with coefficient K3 
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Figure 1 – Break-even point for different products offered – Variant 0
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Variant 5 – the calculation increasing the coefficient 
K1 price in ZK to EUR 40 per request and coeffi-
cient K1 price in TB to EUR 20 per request, and 
increasing the coefficient K2 price in ZK and TB to 
EUR 0.1 per km of route creation. Using Variant 5, 
the revenue from the railway capacity allocation 
would have been 0.12% higher than the total direct 
costs of railway capacity allocation.
Variant 6 – the calculation increasing the coefficient 
K1 price in ZK to EUR 40 per request and the co-
efficient K1 price in TB to EUR 20 per request and 
reducing the coefficient K2 price in ZK and TB to 
EUR 0.04 per km of route creation. Using Variant 
6, the revenue from the railway capacity allocation 
would have been 0.08% higher than the total direct 
costs of railway capacity allocation.
5. PREDICTION FOR RAILWAY 
CAPACITY ALLOCATION IN 2020
From internal resources of the RIA, the authors 
found out about the number of allocation requests 
by individual products in the annual timetables of 
2018 and 2019 and the number of ad hoc allocation 
requests by individual products in 2018 and 2019 
[8]. The data contain the number of allocated data 
timetables (number of routes), number of allocat-
ed route-days, total number of allocated kilometres, 
and the price of railway capacity allocation. 
Using the percentage gains or losses in the ref-
erence years, the authors added data for 2020 as a 
prediction of the development of railway capacity 
allocation. The final prediction values for 2020 are 
shown in Table 3.
and ZJ, and introducing a constant of 0.06 in co-
efficient K1 for N3 and P3 and a constant of 1.3 in 
coefficient K2 and K3 for PJ, ZJ, and a constant of 
1.5 in coefficients K2 and K3 for P3, and introducing 
the coefficient K2 price of EUR 0.04 per km of route 
creation for N3, P3, ZK and TB (ad hoc). Using 
Variant 1, the revenue from railway capacity allo-
cation would have been 1.74% lower than the total 
direct costs of railway capacity allocation.
Variant 2 – the calculation reducing the coefficient 
K1 price to EUR 56 per request in RJ, PJ and ZJ, and 
introducing a constant of 0.06 in coefficient K1 for 
N3 and P3 and a constant of 1.3 in coefficient K2 and 
K3 for PJ, ZJ, and a constant of 1.5 in coefficients K2 
and K3 for P3 and increasing the coefficient K3 price 
in PJ and ZJ to EUR 0.5 per route-day. Using Vari-
ant 2, the revenue from railway capacity allocation 
would have been 1.59% lower than the total direct 
costs of railway capacity allocation.
Variant 3 – the calculation reducing the coefficient 
K1 price to EUR 56 per request in RJ, PJ and ZJ, and 
introducing a constant of 0.06 in coefficient K1 for 
N3 and P3 and increasing the constant value to 1.4 
in coefficient K2 and K3 for PJ, ZJ, and increasing 
the constant value to 1.6 in coefficients K2 and K3 
for P3. Using Variant 3, the revenue from railway 
capacity allocation would have been 0.06% higher 
than the total direct costs of railway capacity allo-
cation.
Variant 4 – the calculation involving an increase in 
the coefficient K2 price in ZK and TB to EUR 0.1 
per km of route creation. Using Variant 4, the rev-
enue from railway capacity allocation would have 
been 0.10% higher than the total direct costs of rail-
way capacity allocation.
Table 2 – Comparison of revenue from railway capacity allocation with total direct costs of railway capacity allocation for the 
individual variants
Variant Revenue from railway capacity allocation (EUR)
Costs of railway capacity 
allocation (EUR)
Difference between revenue 
and costs [%]
Variant 0 4,385,292 > 4,271,200 2.67
Variant 0.1 4,900,096 > 4,271,200 14.72
Variant 1 4,196,704 < 4,271,200 -1.74
Variant 2 4,203,281 < 4,271,200 -1.59
Variant 3 4,273,889 > 4,271,200 0.06
Variant 4 4,275,588 > 4,271,200 0.10
Variant 5 4,276,201 > 4,271,200 0.12
Variant 6 4,274,502 > 4,271,200 0.08
Source: [7, 8, 33]
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products. The aim of the proposed model is for a 
part of the requests to move from the ad hoc mode 
to the annual timetable mode. For both modes to be 
based on the same conditions, the authors decided 
to introduce a non-zero price of coefficient K2 per 
kilometre of route creation for ad hoc products in 
all calculation variants. This leads to an increase in 
the request price in the ad hoc mode. To motivate 
the railway undertakings and applicants to submit 
the requests in the annual timetable mode, the coef-
ficient K1 price was reduced in all annual timetable 
mode products to EUR 56. Table 2 shows the com-
parison of the different calculation variants. Only 
two variants, namely Variant 1 and Variant 2, meet 
the limiting conditions, mainly the condition stipu-
lating that the total revenue from the price of rail-
way capacity allocation should not exceed the total 
direct costs of railway capacity allocation. More ad-
vantageous is Variant 2, as the difference between 
revenue and costs is lower. However, the authors fa-
vour Variant 3 as it is closest to the quantified total 
direct costs of railway capacity allocation.
Comparing the total values of the allocated data 
timetables in 2018 and 2019 and based on the predic-
tion for 2020, the authors want to point out the ever 
increasing number of allocated data timetables, in-
creasing the length of allocated routes and the closely 
related increasing revenue from the price of railway 
capacity allocation [8]. The only decreasing value in 
Table 4 is the number of allocated route-days. This re-
flects the fact that the number of requests for railway 
capacity allocation for several route-days is decreas-
ing, whereas the number of requests for railway ca-
pacity allocation for one route-day is increasing.
6. CONCLUSION
In the opening part of this paper, the authors de-
fined the requirements on target groups of requests 
so that they can be attributed to individual products 
either in the mode of allocating railway capacity 
within the annual timetable, or in the ad hoc mode. 
This definition is vital for proper regulation of the 
demand of railway undertakings for individual 















[km per data 
timetable]
Ø price [EUR 
per data  
timetable]
RJ 14,977 2,808,134 847,778 2,401,643 187.5 56.6 160.36
PJ 1,548 192,213 56,553 276,415 124.1 36.5 178.56
ZJ 518 23,823 27,535 63,467 46.0 53.1 122,52
N3 13,796 28,499 1,285,418 134,871 2.1 93.2 9.78
P3 172,047 173,396 11,849,619 1,797,924 1.0 68.9 10.45
ZK 449 744 15,974 19,219 1.7 35.6 42.80
TB 328 328 12,731 7,223 1.0 38.8 22.02
UI 73,297 72,989 1,807,459 0 1.0 24.7 0
OM 20,397 64,686 1,859,552 0 3.2 91.2 0
JD 1,417 2,5 68,796 0 1.8 48.6 0
Total 298.774 3,367,312 17,831,415 4,700,762 369.4 547.2 546.49
Source: [7, 8, 33]
Table 4 – Allocated data timetables: development in 2018, 2019 and prediction for 2020
Product
Number  












[km per data 
timetable]
Ø price
[EUR per data 
timetable]
2018 266,158 3,469,948 16,325,204 4,124,480 13.0 61.3 15.49
2019 281,569 3,404,399 16,996,621 4,385,292 12.1 60.4 15.57
2020 297,872 3,340,088 17,695,651 4,662,596 11.2 59.4 15.65
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MODEL PRO STANOVENÍ CENY ZA 
PŘIDĚLENÍ KAPACITY DRÁHY
V příspěvku je prezentován model pro stanovení 
ceny za přidělení kapacity dráhy, který plní funkci reg-
ulačního opatření a zároveň splní legislativní požadavky 
na přidělování kapacity dráhy. Za pomoci programu MS 
Excel jsou namodelovány sazby ceny za kapacitu dráhy 
tak, aby byly zohledněny všechny ekonomicky oprávněné 
náklady na přidělování kapacity dráhy a zároveň bylo 
dosaženo takové ceny za přidělování kapacity dráhy, 
která by dopravce motivovala k optimálnímu objed-
návání jednotlivých produktů. Jsou zde analyzovány jed-
notlivé nabízené produkty, které jsou přídělcem kapacity 
dráhy nabízeny a to jak v režimu plánovaného ročního 
jízdního řádu, tak v režimu individuálního ad hoc. Využití 
jednotlivých produktů v rámci žádosti o přidělení kapac-
ity dráhy jsou ovlivněny řadou faktorů jak ze strany 
přídělce kapacity dráhy, tak i ze strany dopravců. Cílem 
navrhovaného modelu je motivovat nejen dopravce, ale i 
přídělce kapacity dráhy o přechod v podávání žádostí o 
přidělení kapacity dráhy z režimu individuálního ad hoc 
do režimu ročního harmonogramu. Jde o nastavení para-
metrů jednotlivých nabízených produktů přídělce, kterým 
je ovlivněna celková cena za přidělení kapacity v jednot-
livých režimech. Ta je pak porovnávaná s nákladovou 
stránkou procesu přidělování kapacity dráhy. Tento pro-
ces pak slouží k zajištění regulace poptávky železničních 
dopravců na dané dráze a může vést k ovlivnění rozhod-
nutí o využití nabízeného produktu.
KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA
model; železniční infrastruktura; kapacita železnice;  
poplatky za přístup k infrastruktuře; manažer  
infrastruktury; jízdní řád.
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